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Labor Market Implications of Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance 
Kanika Kapur 
Employer-provided health insurance covers the 
majority of Americans under the age of 65. A beneficial 
aspect of employers providing health insurance is that 
the group to be insured is selected by a criterion other 
than the demand for health insurance. Hence, the 
problem of adverse selection is sidestepped. Recently, 
however, the disadvantages of the link between 
employment and health insurance, especially those 
pertaining to the labor market, have received a great 
deal of attention in academic and policy circles. 
One problem with this system of employer-provided 
health insurance is that the strong link between 
employment and the provision of health insurance 
implies that if wages do not pedectly offset differences 
in the valuation of health insurance across jobs, 
individuals may not change jobs even when new jobs 
with higher match specific productivity are available. 
This phenomenon, called "job lock," may result in a 
welfare loss. 
Another problem lies in the small-group market 
(typically, firms employing less than 25 persons) for 
health insurance, where the problem of adverse 
selection remains despite the lillie between employment 
and health insurance. Almost 60 percent of non-elderly 
adults without health insurance are employed. Nearly 
two-thirds of uninsured working adults are employed in 
small firms. 
Small firms that provide health insurance to their 
employees struggle to find and keep affordable health 
insurance, because a single expensive illness or 
accident may lead to health insurance cancellations or 
prohibitive price increases. The impact of the small 
group health insurance market on small firm behavior is 
an area of much speculation but little research. 
Despite the academic and policy interest in these 
problems with the system of employer-provided health 
insurance, the extent of the problems and the effect of 
the policy measures have not been fully established. 
The literature on job lock has reached no consensus on 
the importance of portability on job mobility. There is 
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little to no research examining how small firms are 
affected by aspects of the small group health insurance 
market. Furthermore, there is little research that 
evaluates the impact of recently enacted state-level 
health insurance legislation. This dissertation 
addresses this gap between policy and research. 
The first chapter of this dissertation uses the 
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) of 1987 
to measure the importance of job lock. The economics 
literature has not reached a consensus on the severity of 
job lock. Studies using the NMES have found that job 
lock is responsible for a 25-30 percent reduction in job 
mobility-a large and significant effect. Other 
evidence, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
shows that job lock has an insignificant effect on job 
mobility for man-ied men. However, these estimates 
are imprecise; hence, they are unable to reject the 
presence of large levels of job lock suggested by the 
studies using the NMES. This conflicting evidence 
from different data sources and empirical 
methodologies is puzzling for both researchers and 
policymakers. I use the NMES, which has yielded 
precise estimates of job lock, to answer the question "Is 
the conflicting eviden~e on job lock for married men a 
result of differences in the data or in the 
methodology?" 
Ideally, to estimate job lock using the quasi-
experimental difference-in-difference technique, the 
identification of job lock should be based on good 
proxies for family sickness and a relatively comparable 
job-locked experimental and non-locked control 
groups. The difference-in-difference estimator relies 
on the similarity of the experimental and control 
groups in order to identify the effect of interest from 
other exogenous influences. In most of the earlier work 
estimating job lock, insured persons form the 
experimental group and the uninsured form the control 
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group. However, the uninsured differ from the insured 
in terms of base levels of mobility and demographic 
and job characteristics; hence it is unlikely that the 
effect of exogenous influences on the insured group is 
equal to the effect of these influences on the uninsured 
group. The use of these groups to estimate job lock 
may yield inconsistent estimates. 
I refine the difference-in-difference technique by 
creating more-comparable control and experimental 
groups and good proxies for family sickness. Job lock 
should be greater for workers who are sick or have sick 
family members because they are likely to face pre-
existing condition exclusions if they change jobs. In 
addition, they are more likely to find factors such as 
waiting periods for coverage on a new job and lack of 
insurance during job search to be burdensome. I use 
previously unexploited, detailed data on medical 
conditions, health utilization, and medical expenses to 
proxy for sickness. To estimate find two groups which 
are comparable, one of which can be hypothesized to 
be more severely affected by job lock than the other, I 
tum to spousal health insurance. Individuals who have 
access to spousal health insurance (that is, their spouse 
holds employer-provided health insurance) in addition 
to their own employment-related health insurance are 
possibly already covered by their spouse's policy or 
may succeed in getting on a spouse's policy with loose 
rules, even if they do suffer from some pre-existing 
conditions. Therefore, individuals who have their own 
employer-provided health insurance but no spouse 
health insurance and have adverse family health 
conditions are the most likely to be job-locked. 
Using this refined difference-in-difference approach, 
I find insignificant estimates of job lock, and the 
confidence intervals of these estimates exclude large 
levels of job lock. I find that the estimates of job lock 
have the wrong sign and are insignificant. 
Furthermore, the estimates are precise enough to 
exclude large levels of job lock from their confidence 
intervals. While these estimates are consistent with 
those from studies using the SIPP and the PSJD, they 
are far smaller than the estimates using the NMES. To 
resolve this, Ire-analyzed Madrian's 1994 finding of 
significant job lock using family size and pregnancy of 
spouse as job lock measures in the NMES. After 
correcting methodological problems and using better 
data to construct the job lock variables, job lock is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
While, on the whole, job lock does not have a 
significant impact on job mobility, it may effect certain 
subgroups of working individuals more than others. I 
examine this proposition in the second chapter of the 
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dissertation. Since large firms tend to have generous 
health insurance policies with limited pre-existing 
condition clauses, job lock may not be a significant 
concern for individuals considering a move to a large 
firm. However, for individuals consideling a move to a 
small firm, strict pre-existing condition clauses may be 
a significant deterrent to mobility. Furthermore, if 
small-firm policies are less generous than large-firm 
policies, non-portability would be more of a deterrent 
to job transitions to small firms for individuals who 
were employed in large firms (as opposed to those 
employed in small firms). Since most job transitions 
are from large firms to large firms, the overall measure 
of job lock discussed above may mask these impOltant 
differences in transitions. Using the NMES, I estimate 
the magnitude of job lock for individual considering a 
move to a small firm and find that small-firm job lock is 
important for individuals with medical conditions that 
would lead to the denial of coverage by small-group 
insurers. This finding suggests that legislation aimed at 
reducing the problems with the small-firm market may 
reduce job lock. 
In the third chapter, I examine how the small-group 
health insurance market influences small-firm 
employment. The difficulties faced by small firms in 
obtaining health insurance for their employees have 
been widely documented. Only about one-third of 
firms with fewer than SO employees, and one-quarter of 
finns with fewer than 10 employees, offer health 
insurance as a fringe benefit. The small firms that do 
provide health insurance to their employees are in a 
precarious position. Insurance companies, wary of the 
possibility of adverse selection, calculate premiums on 
a yearly basis as the expected value of health care 
utilization. Hence, a single high-cost incident during 
the year could lead to a substantial surcharge on the 
premiums for all members in the finn. Alternatively, 
the insurance company could refuse to write a policy 
for the high-risk individuals in the group, and in 
extreme cases could refuse to insure the entire group. 
Small firms could respond to the inadequacy and 
unpredictability of their potential group health 
insurance policies by maintaining a work force that has 
a low expected utilization of health care services. 
Assuming that firms are unable to perfectly tailor 
individual wages to health insurance costs, small firms 
may screen out employees with high expected health 
costs in order to keep premium variability in check. 
There has been little previous empirical work that 
uses detailed health data to examine such employment 
screening. Using the NMES data, I construct health 
measures based on the Office of Technological 
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Assessment's 1988 classification of 45 common 
medical conditions into three categories according to 
the underwriting behavior of individual and small-
group insurance companies. Medical conditions are 
classified as those leading to outright denial of 
coverage, those leading to exclusion restrictions, and 
those leading to higher premiums. 
I find small firms that offer health insurance are 
more likely to screen out workers with families that 
have conditions that lead to higher premiums. These 
workers are 65 percent less likely to be hired in small 
firms with insurance and 30 percent more likely to be 
laid off from small firms with insurance relative to large 
firms with insurance. Howcver, small firms are no 
more likely than large firms to screen out workers who 
have families with conditions leading to denial of 
coverage or cxclusion restrictions, since these 
conditions do not add to their medical claims. These 
results suggest that the link bctween small-firm hcalth 
insurance and employment may lead to employment 
distortions and inefficiency. Therefore, small-group 
health insurance reform that reduces pre-existing 
condition limitations and regulates the pricing of small 
firm policies may be warranted. 
In the last chapter, I study the impact of state small-
group health insurance reforms on job mobility and 
employment outcomes, focusing on three types of 
reforms aimed to ensure the following. First, small 
firms that want health insurance coverage are accepted 
and renewed by insurers. Second, when an individual 
changes jobs, waiting periods for coverage and pre-
existing condition exclusions are short or non-existent. 
Third, premiums arc based on only certain allowable 
rating factors (such as age or family size and not on 
factors such as health status) and premium rate 
variations are limited. These laws generally apply to 
employer-sponsored health insurance plans covering 
2-50 workers. 
I address two main questions. First, have portability 
refonlls aimed to facilitate job transitions and reduce 
job lock increased job mobility? Second, by limiting 
the use of health status in premium setting, have rating 
rcfonns increased the proportion of individuals with 
adverse health characteristics in insured small finns, 
and thereby reduced employment distortion in small 
firms? I develop a simple theoretical model which 
shows that contrary to common belief, portability 
refonns have an ambiguous cffect on job mobility. 
Another interesting theoretical implication, possibly 
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unforeseen by policy makers, is that while rating 
reforms reduce small-firm health insurance costs for the 
sick, and thcreby increase small-firm hiring of the sick, 
rating reforms increase health insurance costs for older 
individuals and therefore reduce small-firm hiring for 
the old. This is due to the fact that age is positively 
correlated with sickness, and rating reforms restrict the 
use of sickness in setting premiums, resulting in greater 
weight on age in premium setting. 
The empirical analysis uses March Current 
Population Survey data from 1991-1997. My results 
suggest that rating rcforms increase relative job 
mobility and small-firm employment opportunities of 
individuals who have disabled family members. 
Therefore, by reducing the cost of health insurance for 
sick individuals in small firms, rating refonns may 
reduce employment distortions due to the small-group 
health insurance market. On the other hand, rating 
reforms result in the setting of premiums on the basis of 
demographic factors such as age that are highly 
correlated with health status, hence these reforms 
decrease small-finn employment opportunities for 
older individuals. Therefore, rating refonns must be 
judged, at least partly, on the basis of whether this 
redistlibution of health insurance costs from the sick to 
the old enhances welfarc. 
The impact of portability reform, which was 
introduced to reduce job lock, is somewhat mixed. 
Portability increases job mobility for insurance holders, 
suggesting that it reduces job lock. However, 
portability unaccompanied by rating reform reduces the 
proportion of insured small-firm new hires with family 
disabilities. This suggests that by increasing the cost of 
health insurance, portability may have a negative 
impact on individuals who have adverse health 
characteristics. By implementing both portability and 
rating laws at the same time, most states have balanced 
the negative effects of portability on individuals with 
adverse health characte11stics with the positive effects 
of the rating laws. The impact of the small group 
p0l1abilityreform serves as an important indicator of 
the expected effect of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HlPAA) that was signed into law in 
August 1996. This federal legislation mandates 
portability without any accompanying restriction on 
premium rating. The experience from the small-group 
health insurance reform suggests that HIPPA may have 
a negative impact on the employment opportunities of 
individuals with adverse health characteristics. 
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